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Abstract
This chapter reviews and extends the literature on incentives in large organisations,
applying it to the work of aid agencies in general and the European Commission's own
foreign aid programme in particular. It identifies the main predicament of such
organisations as a lack of direct answerability to beneficiaries, accountability to a
multiplicity of donors, and a major difficulty in monitoring the quality with which certain
important tasks are performed. The result is an excessive focus upon input-related tasks
(budgets, personnel) and insufficient attention to the quality of the aid projects
undertaken. The question arises to what extent these are inevitable given the constraints
on an aid agency, and to what extent they can be alleviated by intelligent organisational
design. The chapter therefore reviews the literature on principal-agent models,
particularly those with multiple principals and multiple tasks performed by each agent. It
then presents a two-period model of the allocation of multiple tasks within a bureaucratic
organization. It shows that the incentives for bundling and separation of tasks within such
an organization depend on the relative ease of monitoring of the two tasks, as well as on
the extent of correlation between the talents they require. It demonstrates that
organizations may rationally place ''too much'' emphasis on routine tasks, provided these
reveal information about talents that may be valuable in non-routine tasks, and in spite of
the fact that the incentives to perform the non-routine tasks well will thereby be blunted.
Applications to the work of the European Commission, and policy implications, are
extensively discussed.
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1. Introduction: the problem
Aid agencies differ from other organisations in the public and private sectors of
society in a number of important ways, but most strikingly in that the people for whose
benefit they are supposed to work are not the same as those from whom their revenues
are obtained. Some people (taxpayers or private donors as the case may be) pay money
directly or indirectly to the agency so that other people may benefit. This simple fact may
seem unremarkable, but in reality it creates a strikingly difficult set of problems in
institutional design.
Why should this be so? Other types of organisation, both public and private, carry out
activities for the supposed benefit of those who pay them to do so. If the supposed
beneficiaries are not happy with the benefits they receive they can protest – either by
withdrawing their custom (if the organisation operates in a market), or by voting against
the political authorities (if the organisation is controlled by a political process). In order
to find out whether the benefits received are adequate given the costs, the beneficiaries
need only consult themselves and their own preferences. Does this product yield good
value for money? Are these public services worth the taxes we pay? Such interrogations
of oneself are the stuff of daily life in all free societies.
Aid agencies are quite different. It sometimes happens that the sponsors - taxpayers or
donors or both - judge an aid agency purely by its public pronouncements (as though the
principal task of the agency were to deliver public pronouncements rather than to deliver
aid). But more often they are concerned to know to what extent the agency is doing the
things that the supposed beneficiaries need. However, this is extremely difficult to
evaluate, since there is frequently no obvious mechanism for transmitting the
beneficiaries’ view of the process to the sponsors. Instead the sponsors must rely on
various indicators of performance, some of which are easier to measure than others, and
the relative weighting of which is extremely hard to assess and will typically differ from
one sponsor to another. In other words, it is intrinsic part of the predicament of aid
agencies that they are subject to multiple conflicting criteria of evaluation. They perform
multiple tasks, and they are answerable to multiple sponsors with differing evaluations of
those tasks.
Note that the argument here is quite subtle. There is nothing unusual about the
multiplicity of tasks: except in a trivial sense of the word “task” any person in any
organisation performs multiple tasks. But in many organisations these tasks result in an
outcome which is evaluated by the person directly affected, who is therefore in the best
position to judge the contribution of the different tasks to the overall result. In an aid
agency, by contrast, the overall evaluation must be performed by someone who has only
the outcomes of the different tasks to go on and who has only limited capacities to
observe them. There is no clearly defined trade-off between various tasks and the goals to
be accomplished – in contrast to private companies where profit is the single goal and the
trade-off with various tasks is more easily measurable.
Is it surprising, then, that aid agencies frequently behave in ways that display an over-
reliance on formal rules as against the exercise of sound judgement, a tendency to worry
too much about meeting quantitative targets and not enough about the quality of the
grants or loans they make?  Is it any wonder that they pay too much attention to the
performance of tasks that are easy to monitor, like the drunkard looking for his lost keys
under a lamp-post because ''that's where the light is''? Is it remarkable that they pay more
attention to the inputs to the aid process than to the outputs? And if the answer to some of
these questions is ''yes'', is that inevitable given the intrinsic nature of aid agencies
themselves, or is it something that intelligent organisational design could reasonably hope
to avoid? This chapter seeks to shed light on some of these important questions.
The argument of the chapter proceeds through a number of steps. First, many aid
agencies (though not all2) are themselves public administrations, and suffer in
consequence from problems characteristic of public administrations everywhere. These
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include multiple objectives, the difficulty of measuring results, and consequently weak
incentives for staff, including relatively fixed salaries and a dependence on internal
promotion procedures that invite information manipulation to advance careers. Some
valuable insights into these phenomena have been yielded by recent developments in
principal-agent theory, which deals with the incentive issues that arise when there is a
serious divergence of interest between those who perform tasks (agents) and those on
whose behalf the tasks are performed (principals). The first task of the chapter is
therefore to review some of the general insights of these theories.
Next, we consider the more particular problems of the European Union as an aid
donor. These arise for two main reasons:
· First, the European Commission (EC: the EU's administrative body) is not
exactly like any other public administration. It is answerable not to a single
principal but to fifteen different national governments, with theoretical if not de
facto parity of status. This leads to potential conflicts of priorities that exceed in
degree those of other public administrations. Even the well-known conflicts
between executive and legislature in countries such as the United States and (to a
lesser extent) France do not involve the administration in the need to respond to
pressures from quite so many different directions. Furthermore, none of the
pressures come directly from the aid beneficiaries themselves, who have no
feedback mechanism for influencing the behaviour of the donor except through
the circuitous route of influencing the donor's own principals. Since the donor's
principals care directly about the inputs into the aid process (contracts for
consultants and for the supply of materials), but only indirectly about outputs
(effects in the beneficiary countries), the various biases characteristic of public
administrations will almost inevitably be more striking in the case of the EC than
in public administrations of the more familiar kind.
· Secondly, although multilateral aid agencies share this predicament of
answerability to multiple principals, the EC is not quite like other aid agencies
either. Political oversight in multilateral agencies (such as the World Bank or
IMF) is typically exercised through executive boards, which are intermediary fora
in which there is at least some attempt to form coherent objectives through
repeated interaction, and which are composed of full-time representatives of the
member governments. The governments' often expressed anxiety that their
representatives "go native" is precisely testimony to the fact that they seek
compromises in the interest of a more coherent overall policy. But the main
pressure on EC accountability comes through the Council, which is composed of
serving politicians whose main focus is on their domestic interests. They spend
too little time on EC affairs to come under any significant pressure to "go native"
(a criticism that tends to be confined to full-time Commissioners rather than part-
time Council Members).
· Thirdly, a combination of budgetary pressures and the intrinsic character of the
challenges involved mean that a large part of the EC's external aid programme has
taken the form of technical assistance for the purpose of fostering institutional
reform. Success and failure in this area are notoriously hard to measure even by
the standards of aid programmes elsewhere, a fact that has profound consequences
(as we shall see) for the nature of the work the EC can reasonably be expected to
carry out.
The difficulties faced by the EC in the management of its aid programmes have been
well documented, and have indeed acquired considerable notoriety recently3. To som
extent, a focus on questions of fraud and illegality can divert attention from other
difficulties, such as the extent to which EC aid is achieving its objectives (a characteristic
of the output of the process rather than its inputs). Indeed, to the extent that a focus on
inputs may worsen the quality of scrutiny of outputs, procedures designed to tackle fraud
or illegality might make some of the difficulties described above more severe. The recent
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts identifies says, for instance, of the
appointment of M. Berthelot by Commissioner Cresson that "the work performed was
manifestly deficient in terms of quantity, quality and relevance. The Community did not
get value for money"4, but recommends that "the human resources allocated to internal
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4 Ibid., para 8.1.35.
auditing be greatly increased"5, a measure that increases attention to financial accuracy
without doing anything to augment quality, relevance or value for money. The overall
impact of such measures will depend to a considerable extent on whether scrutiny of
inputs and scrutiny of outputs complement or substitute for one another in the day-to-day
work of aid officials.
Are such problems avoidable? It is striking that the more general complaints made
about EC aid echo across studies of aid agencies everywhere, in kind if not always in
degree (see Cassen et.al., 19946). This suggests that comparative evaluations of different
agencies may help to illuminate the extent to which such problems are inevitable, and the
extent to which they may be capable of being resolved by intelligent organisational
design. A particularly interesting and thorough documentation occurs in a number of
studies of the World Bank7, as well as in the Bank’s own Oral History Program. The case
of the World Bank is all the more telling since it has enjoyed more than most agencies an
access to high-quality technical expertise and has been subject to a need to justify its
performance before sceptical national shareholders. The Bank's case is particularly
interesting for the EC because of the nature of its answerability to multiple member
governments; it should not surprise us if the phenomena uncovered in the Bank studies
appear in the EC to an even greater degree.
The extent to which the measurability of success and failure determined priorities is a
recurring theme of the Bank studies. Mason & Asher (1973), for example, note that “the
Bank recognized [during its first twenty-five years] that investments of many kinds were
needed for development but frequently implied that one kind was more essential than any
other…projects to develop electric power and transport facilities were accordingly
considered especially appropriate for Bank financing. At the same time the Bank was led
to eschew certain fields traditionally open to public investment, even in the highly-
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developed free-enterprise economies: namely, sanitation, education, and health facilities.
Investments in these so-called ‘social overhead’ fields were widely considered to be as
fundamental to development as are investments in hydroelectric sites, railroads, highways
and ‘economic overhead’ programs. The contribution of social overhead projects to
increased production, however, is less measurable and direct than that of power plants”
(pp.189, 150).
When one senior bank official was asked in 1961: “Doesn’t it really in fact turn out
that the Bank…puts a great emphasis on specific projects partly for public relations
reasons and partly…to satisfy the market…[that] the Bank’s bonds are tied to something
physical which can be seen and pointed to thereafter[?]”, he replied “Yes, I would
agree?”8.
This is not to say that the Bank has only recently paid attention to the less tangible
sides of development. For example, although “institution-building” is often thought of as
a recent fashion, it has been a central component of many World Bank loan agreements
since the early 1950s (Kapur et.al., vol.1, p.103). Nevertheless, it was typically a
component of a project that had been selected for its overall ease of monitoring – and in
the implementation it was easy for that component to be overlooked except insofar as it
contributed to the aggregate measurable outcome.
What has changed substantially over time is that the targets and aims of Bank lending
have multiplied. Writing of the 1980s and early 1990s, Kapur et.al. write:
“Meanwhile, trying to enforce multiple preconditioned policy targets was sapping the
seriousness of the Bank’s adjustment lending. It was a kind of Catch-22. Targets had
been added to adjustment exercises because they were good causes and it was
administratively easy to do. But procedurally the choice had been for pre-conditioning:
borrowers entered into fairly precise contracts to do or not to do things that were
sufficiently measurable for nonperformance to be conspicuous. Review after review of
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adjustment lending wrung its hands over the proliferation of borrowers’ agreed
undertakings. In the Second (1990) Review of Adjustment Lending (RAL)…the number
of undertakings per adjustment loan was up to fifty-six, and it continued to rise. There
was no way so many simultaneous agreements could be monitored, let alone enforced”
(vol.1, p.30).
At the same time as having to undertake multiple tasks evaluated according to
multiple criteria, the Bank has been answerable to multiple constituencies. Many
particular loans have been made – or blocked – because of pressure from shareholder
governments. To take some early examples, Kapur et.al. note nine World Bank loans to
Nicaragua between 1951 and 1956 due to the “highly convenient” relationship between
Washington and the Somoza family9; the fact that “a loan to Iraq was rushed through the
Board in 1950 [because] British relations with Iraq, and access to its oil, were at stake”;
the reversal in 1956 under US pressure of an earlier decision not to open a line of export
credit to Iran; and continued obstacles to lending to Indonesia because of Dutch
objections to its expropriations of foreign assets10.
These examples suggest that even multilateral aid agencies can reproduce within
themselves some of the problems of co-ordination that have been noted by Cassen et.al.
(1994, esp. p.184) for the separate activities of bilateral donors. They argue that the
obstacles to co-ordination between donors are that
· “co-ordination is likely to impair the freedom with which donors can pursue their
commercial and political interests through their aid programmes”.
· “donors know there are subjects on which they are likely to disagree, particularly in
the matter of development policies”.
· “co-ordination can be costly in administrative time and expense”.
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The consequence is a “proliferation of aid projects and of equipment types…The
results of this are very commonly a large number of projects which the recipient is ill-
equipped to manage”. If this is true of the actions of bilateral donors it is also true of the
outcome of the pressures exerted on multilateral agencies by their multiple
constituencies. Nevertheless, such agencies can often do better than bilateral ones in
precisely the areas where procedures are open to easy monitoring – for example, in the
implementation of “relatively transparent and internationally competitive bidding
procedures for procurement”11.
None of these observations necessarily imply (and none are intended by their authors
to imply) that aid agencies are necessarily falling below some reasonable standard of
behaviour. These features of their procedures may be the inevitable predicament of a
large bureaucracy whose sponsors are not its beneficiaries (a description would
encompass large non-governmental organisations as well as public aid administrations).
But how can we assess such a claim, and what scope for organisational improvement
might such a claim concede? To answer this question it is necessary to look more closely
at recent developments in the economic theory of organisational design.
Although it is nearly a century since Max Weber first introduced bureaucracy as a
serious subject of study, the formal analysis of bureaucratic organisations (including both
large firms and non-market organisations) is still in a very underdeveloped state12. It
forms part of the more general theory of incentives under asymmetric information, that is
of circumstances where individuals need to be motivated to act in certain ways even
though their actions cannot be perfectly monitored and enforced. The reason why the
formal theory is still underdeveloped is that is still young. It dates from the 1970s, and
has come to be known as principal-agent theory. It considers the relation between one
party (a principal) who has an interest in the performance of a certain task (such the
management of a firm, the farming of a piece of land, the undertaking of a bureaucratic
task) – and a second party (an agent), who has to undertake the task directly and must be
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motivated to do so in the principal’s interest. In the case of aid agencies we can think of
two types of principal-agent problem: one is that the administrators have to be motivated
to work in the interests of the funders. The other is that both funders and administrators
claim to be working in the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries, but need to be given
credible incentives to do so. Finding the right incentives is at the heart of the principal-
agent problem.
Principal-agent theory has yielded some powerful insights in many applications, but
its usefulness for the study of bureaucracy has only just begun to be explored. Its early
applications were to circumstances where the principal had simple and clear goals (profit
or output, say), and the other party (an agent) had to undertake a single task. The focus
was therefore on the intrinsic effects of the divergence of interests between the parties, in
the presence of asymmetric information. However, most large bureaucracies have to
undertake a range of tasks, and many pursue what are in effect multiple goals, as the
discussion above of the EC's predicament has illustrated. Yet since many of the most
interesting incentive problems arise precisely in large organisations it has been common
to draw inferences from simpler models, without any rigorous basis for knowing when
such conclusions are likely to be robust.
More recent work in the theory of incentives has been exploring the consequences of
relaxing the various limiting assumptions of the simple principal-agent model. The next
section of the paper will review the literature on multiple agents, and the literature on
multiple principals, which is the formal way of representing the predicament of an agency
subject to conflicting pressures from many constituencies. These multiple principals
could be thought of as the different shareholders of the World Bank, or the 15 member
states of the European Union who impose multiple pressures on their common agent the
European Commission. Then I shall consider an issue closer to the problem under
investigation, namely the question what happens when a principal requires the
performance of multiple tasks. A recent important paper by Dewatripont et.al. (2000) will
be described in some detail, and then I shall develop a model designed to capture some
phenomena that Dewatripont et.al. do not consider. These will turn out to be of particular
importance for organisations that have to decide the emphasis to be given to several tasks
in the context of developing a career structure for the agents concerned.
Two particular features characterise the problem of how to perform multiple
interdependent tasks - that is, tasks in which the performance of one is affected by how
well the other is performed, either because the two tasks compete for the time or other
inputs supplied by the agent or because one of them is in some sense an input into the
other (that is, they may be substitutes or complements). First, the tasks may differ in the
ease with which their performance can be monitored – one might require simply financial
indicators while the other might require overall impact assessments. We have already
noted how pervasive has been this problem in the activities of the EC and the World
Bank, and other agencies are little different even if the phenomenon has yet to be so
minutely documented. S condly, the interdependence of these tasks means that incentives
for the performance of one will affect the performance of the other. Under some
circumstances, the more thoroughly the second task is performed the harder it will be to
perform the first. For example, one task may be the preparation of grant or loan
proposals, while the second may be the screening of the same proposals. The more
rigorous the screening the fewer proposals may be left to go through. Under other
circumstances, though, the performance of one task may enter positively into the
production function of the other. For example, the first task may be institution-building
while the second is the operation of some physical infrastructure: the better the first task
is performed the easier it may be to perform the second. In this example, the first task is
the harder to monitor but the converse is also often observed. The first task might consist
of supply of some physical inputs while the second consists of operating those inputs in a
way consistent with the needs of beneficiaries: the first can be observed quite precisely
while the satisfactory performance of the second is much harder to establish. Indeed, one
possible explanation for the so-called “inputs bias” in the implementation of aid
programmes may be that this latter structure of aid tasks is more common than the
former.
While as a general rule these features are simply given by the intrinsic nature of the
task concerned, there may be circumstances where a given ultimate objective (poverty
alleviation, say) can be accomplished with more than one structure of tasks, in which case
the particular character of the complementarity or substitutability of tasks becomes a
matter of choice for the organisation concerned. For example, one consequence of the use
of compensation in kind rather than in cash for tribal groups resettled as a consequence of
the Narmada dam project in North-Western India has been a typically low quality of land
available for resettlement. As Satyanarayana (2000) reports, this has been because
requiring government agencies to be responsible for disbursement of (easily monitored)
budgetary outlays as well as for the quality of land purchase (which is hard to monitor)
has led them to devote disproportionate attention to the former task at the expense of the
latter. In these circumstances cash compensation (which allows the individuals to be
responsible for their own land purchase and enables government officials to concentrate
on a simpler task structure) would have been preferable.
To summarise, this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
multiple agents, and the literature on multiple principals. Section 3 discusses the nature of
multiple tasks and describes a model due to Dewatripont et.al. (2000). Section 4 outlines
the main model of this paper. Section 5 concludes.
2. Multiple agents and multiple principals
2.1 The costs of delegation
One of the principal findings of the principal-agent literature is that in the presence of
asymmetric information between the principal and the agent there will be unavoidable
costs of delegation of a task – costs over and above the minimum necessary to
compensate the agent for the effort of undertaking the task in the first place. These costs
fall into two broad categories:
· When there is moral hazard (the agent cannot commit to an efficient action), the
agent will have to be exposed to more risk than would otherwise be desirable, in
order to give him incentives to work in the principal's interests. He will therefore
need to be compensated by a higher average payment than would be necessary
under complete information, in order to compensate him for the additional risk.
Thus the director of an agency may have to resign if the agency fails to meet its
targets, even if it cannot be demonstrated that this was the fault of the director; the
director needs to be given an incentive to lower the risk of such an eventuality
even if it cannot be altogether eliminated.
· When there is adverse selection (the agent has private information prior to signing
the contract) the principal must give him an incentive to reveal this information
correctly. This constitutes an informational rent, which lowers the return to the
principal compared with what she would receive under complete information.
Thus, for example, expatriate employees of an international agency may need to
be given standard “hardship allowances” for foreign postings even if in some
postings they may be substantially better off as a result – otherwise they will have
an incentive to exaggerate the hardship of the particular circumstances they face.
It is by now well known (see Mookherjee, 1985) that when several agents work on
behalf of one principal, these delegation costs can be reduced if the principal takes
account of any correlation in the uncertainty faced by different agents. The way this can
be achieved is by using “yardstick” performance comparisons. For example, “yardstick
regulation” uses the correlation between the shocks affecting the production costs of
several regulated firms to devise rules for determining the movement of a price cap. A
firm is rewarded not for its absolute success in reducing costs but for its success relative
to the costs of other firms13. Similarly, comparison between the performance of different
project directors in somewhat similar circumstances may make it easier to tell to what
extent adverse performance on any one project was due to bad luck as opposed to bad
management. If one project did badly while others facing similar shocks did well it is
more likely to be a failure of management. Another example is the presence of a number
of different agencies answerable to a major general organisation such as the United
Nations: recent management failures in UNESCO were able to be addressed by pointing
to the fact that these were not the inevitable consequence of being a UN agency, as the
superior performance of other UN agencies demonstrated.
Whereas the presence of multiple agents has a fairly unambiguous effect on
improving information flows (subject to the costs of administration and information
processing), the presence of multiple principals has a more complex effect. Many
interesting issues arise when an agent works on behalf of more than one principal. This
may happen in one of two main ways:
· Hierarchy. A principal delegates a task to an agent who further delegates the task
or some part of it to a subordinate. In this case the agent can be thought of as
acting also as a principal with respect to the subordinate. This is a very common
predicament for all large organisations, most of whose members are
simultaneously seeking to provide incentives for their subordinates while
themselves responding to the incentives of their superiors.
· Joint delegation. An agent works directly on behalf of two or more principals,
each of whom has an interest in some dimension of the work performed by the
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agent, and the agent's performance in one dimension influences his incentives for
performance in another. The situation of the EC's new Common Service is a case
in point, but all the EU institutions are in some sense the result of joint delegation
by the member states.
Most organisations of any degree of complexity contain elements of both hierarchy and
joint delegation. We consider these in turn.
2.2 Hierarchy
There are three main ways in which the incentives in a hierarchy differ from those
in a simple bilateral principal-agent relationship:
The Chain of Delegation
There is a longer ''chain of delegation'' which means there is potentially an efficiency
loss at each stage in the chain, and the incentives of those further down the chain are
further and further removed from those of the principal. Examples:
· The sponsors of an aid agency delegate its management to directors. But the
directors cannot carry out all the tasks themselves so delegate them to subordinate
staff. The directors seek to ensure staff act in the directors' rather than the
sponsors' interests.
· Citizens delegate political action to elected representatives. The latter delegate it
to a government. Scrutiny of the governments' actions is carried out by MPs
rather than the citizens directly.
Here it is worth noting that the feature of aid agencies described at the start of this
paper has a radical implication. Aid beneficiaries are not part of the constituency of the
political owners of the aid agency: the chain of delegation is broken. Only the firms and
consultants who provide inputs into aid programs are part of that constituency, and this
fact will strengthen any pre-existing inputs bias in aid.
Intermediaries to Enhance Strategic Credibility
The principal can use an intermediary (a “manager”) to enforce a more credible set of
incentives for the agent than she would be able to implement by herself. This is
potentially beneficial to the principal. Note that sometimes the way in which this
mechanism is made credible is through joint delegation with another principal, so
hierarchy and joint delegation may reinforce each other in this respect. Examples:
· A multilateral agency may be able to resist pressure to make loans for purely
political purposes than would the aid arm of a single country. The World Bank
examples given above suggest that this will not always be successful (though they
may also illustrate the dangers of having one or two dominant shareholders as
opposed to a more balanced allocation of power). Nevertheless, Cassen et.al.
(1994, p.215) conclude that on balance multilateral agencies “are largely
apolitical” compared to bilateral donors. However, this conclusion appears more
reasonable for those multilateral agencies that have genuinely delegated their
management to an executive board than for those (like the EC) where
responsibility rests in the hands of serving politicians from member states. One
lesson may be that more genuinely devolved control may be necessary to diminish
the extent of politicisation of EC aid (or, more accurately, of influence by the
commercial interests of member states).
· Multilateral agencies may be able credibly to implement reasonably competitive
and non-discriminatory procedures for tendering and procurement. EC experience
suggests this may be easier (because it can be enforced by easily monitored
auditing procedures) than diminishing politicisation in the choice of projects and
beneficiaries14 - another revealing instance of inputs bias at work.
Manipulation by intermediaries
An intermediary can use the terms under which the agent is monitored in a strategic
manner to improve her ability to extract concessions from the principal. This is
potentially costly to the principal. It is likely to occur whenever the manager does not just
play a role in a contract with the agent determined by the principal, but also has some
influence over the terms of that contract. Examples:
· If the agent could be motivated by some combination of incentive payments and
direct monitoring by the manager, the manager may choose more monitoring than
is necessary, in order to increase his indispensability to the principal (see
Anderlini, 1990). This may explain a tendency for aid organisations to be
unnecessarily large from the point of view of their sponsors’ interests. It also
accounts for some of the phenomena described in Murrell (this volume), where
contractors influence the terms of an aid contract to increase their own rent.
· If recruitment of the agent is the responsibility of a manager in an organisation,
the latter may deliberately recruit low-quality people to prevent them from being
promoted above him. Alternatively she may tend to avoid recruiting or rewarding
those with scarce technical skills, whose promotion above her she may have
particular difficulty in preventing. One way of resolving this difficulty is through
the use of seniority-based promotion systems: these can be seen as a form of
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commitment device designed to reassure managers that they will not be
threatened by recruiting high quality workers. In bureaucracies where the
performance of workers is hard for senior management to monitor, and where
they must depend on intermediate management for this information, this means
that relatively inflexible seniority-based promotion systems are likely to be
particularly common. This will somewhat mitigate, but will not avoid altogether,
the adverse recruitment incentives just described.
2.3 Joint delegation
This occurs when an agent works in common for more than one principal. In
addition to the obvious examples cited above, such as the answerability of the European
Commission to 15 member states, joint delegation also occurs within large organisations.
For example, the Commission has created a Common Service to manage the
implementation of aid projects originating in several different Directorates-General. Joint
delegation differs rather obviously from simple delegation in that the actions taken by the
various principals to motivate the agent may impose externalities on each other. This is
likely to result in various inefficiencies15, ranging from simple confusion over priorities
to more systematic instances where the agent pursues a series of narrow goals instead of a
coherent broad goal. For instance, an aid agency might fund a large number of
inefficiently small projects to satisfy its various donors in turn rather than a smaller
number of large ones. So why should it ever be in the interest of the principals to
undertake joint delegation? What could be the compensating advantages (a fuller account
of these is given in Neven et.al., 1998, chapter 3)?
                                                                                                                                      
(ibid., para 9.4.14).
15 More precisely, the agents' actions are not even constrained (second-best) efficient - they do not even
maximise the joint surplus of the principals subject to the constraints of asymmetric information.
Coordination
The principals may be able to use the agent to co-ordinate their actions in a way that
they are prevented from doing directly. One example from industrial economics is when
the principals are two firms that are not allowed either to merge, to co-ordinate their
pricing behaviour or directly to share markets (because of competition law).
Nevertheless, by using a joint distributor (for example) they can effectively ensure that
this distributor coordinates their pricing and shares the market on their behalf (see
Bernheim & Whinston, 1986). In the context of aid agencies, examples might include the
following:
· Bilateral agencies may come under strong political pressure to use aid as a means
of furthering competition for recipient countries’ markets. A joint agency may be
able to commit more credibly not to seek to do so; though, as the discussion above
emphasised, it may not be easy to make this commitment stick.
· Where aid is tied to some general political goal that has multiple interpretations
(such as the furtherance of democracy), a multilateral agency may be able to
commit to avoid using aid to further particular political interest groups within the
donor countries and concentrate instead on supporting more open political
processes. The charter of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, for instance, includes a commitment to the furtherance of
democracy, whereas many individual countries’ aid programmes have been
strongly tied to the fortunes of particular political parties. However, the example
of Russia makes clear that multilateralism has not shielded the IMF and World
Bank from considerable pressure to make loans to support President Yeltsin.
Again the problem may lie with insufficient multilateralism rather than with
multilateralism per se.
Commitment to the agent's incentives
The presence of one principal may be a means whereby the other principal can
commit to an incentive structure for the agent that would otherwise not be credible. An
example:
· A bilateral donor that tried to commit itself to using competitive and non-
discriminatory procurement policies might come under heavy political pressure to
favour its own suppliers, especially if domestic interest groups could claim that
other countries were not doing the same. But the same commitment may be much
easier to make for a multilateral agency, since each country can argue to its
domestic interest groups that other countries insist upon non-discriminatory
procedures. All countries may be collectively better off if such a commitment is
reached (there is less waste in the overall aid budget), even if each country on its
own has an interest in trying to favour its own suppliers.
Inefficiency as an ex post threat
The inefficiency of joint delegation may be used as a threat to give the agent a
strategic advantage in negotiating with a third party (see Martimort, 1993). Examples:
· When President Clinton obtained “fast-track” authority to negotiate a GATT deal,
this was time-limited so that other countries had an incentive to reach an
agreement quickly, for fear of authority reverting to Congress (a set of multiple
principals).
· Aid initiatives may be dispersed between agencies rather than concentrated in the
hands of a single super-agency, in order to make capture by special interest
groups more difficult. So various UN agencies in charge of children, health and so
on may face problems of coordination, but this may be thought preferable to
undue concentration of power in the hands of a single agency.
Economies of scope
There may be important economies of scope between the activities performed for one
principal and the tasks required by another. To get two agents to do the job would involve
wasteful duplication of activity. However, the sharing of tasks creates some significant
distortionary incentives. This is particularly true where the principals are not of the same
kind (for instance, several member states), but rather involve quite different kinds of
principal (for instance, a donor political authority and a set of beneficiaries, or a set of
taxpayers and a set of consumers). One familiar day-to-day example of this kind of
problem in joint delegation occurs in the medical profession, where doctors act
simultaneously as agents for their patients and for whoever is paying for the treatment
(typically an insurance company or the State). For the latter the doctor must certify the
patient’s state of health and therefore the level of resources to which the patient’s
insurance contract entitles him. For the patient himself the doctor must give advice as to
the best way of regaining health given the resources available. The former task creates
incentives for under-diagnosis, the latter for over-diagnosis. This analogy is very apt to
aid agencies, for like doctors agencies work for the benefit of those who are typically not
their paymasters. Specifically:
· Agencies typically act to report on the objective need for funding of various
beneficiary countries. This is true not just in the high-profile cases of famine and
natural disaster, where the reports of agencies on the scene are often the only
available information about the scale of the disaster. More mundanely, it is the
reports of agencies from their projects “one the ground” that provide the basis
under which appeals for funds are made (to the public or to the political
authorities).
· Agencies also, and obviously, act to further the interests of the aid beneficiaries.
This is entirely proper, though it also creates incentives to lobby on behalf of the
beneficiaries in respect of appeals for funds. And to the extent that agencies'
budgets are dependent on the outcome of such lobbing, it makes agencies into
natural allies of those who would exaggerate the objective funding needs in
particular cases16.
Insofar as they act as agents of their sponsors, agencies may have an incentive to
downplay the scale of difficulties in the beneficiary countries. Insofar as they act as
agents of the beneficiaries they may have an incentive to exaggerate them (this has been a
persistent theme of critics of foreign aid on the political right). Even if it might be better
for sponsors and beneficiaries to have separate agencies representing them, the
duplication of effort this would require would be thoroughly wasteful.
As this example indicates, assessing the efficiency of joint delegation is no easy
matter, since it typically involves a trade-off between benefits (such as economies of
scope, or improved credibility of commitments) and costs in the form of imperfect
internalisation of the externalities between the principals. If we consider either solely the
costs or solely the benefits it is easy to gain a misleading impression of the overall
character of the joint delegation relationship.
A contrasting problem: multiple tasks
In the next section we consider a much more recent development of the simple
principal-agent model, namely the extension to the case where the agent can potentially
perform a multiplicity of tasks, but where some of these tasks are much more
straightforward to monitor than others. This predicament arises in all large bureaucracies,
and in that sense is by no means peculiar to aid agencies. But it arises in aid agencies in a
                                                 
16 De Waal (1998) is a strong statement of this point.
particularly strong form, as we shall see. This is because aid agencies face even greater
problems with monitoring the quality of work, because of the lack of direct feedback
from beneficiaries in their structure of command and responsibility. This lack of feedback
enhances the input bias that has already been discussed.
 The basic foundations of this model draw on two sets of ideas. First there is the
''career concerns'' model of Holmstrom (1982), which shows what happens when agents
are motivated not by direct monetary rewards but by the hope of demonstrating their
abilities to some kind of professional labour market. This is particularly applicable to the
case of aid agencies whose staff tend to be salaried rather than paid in a manner directly
linked to ostensible performance. Secondly, there is the multi-task model of Holmstrom
& Milgrom (1991), which demonstrates that when tasks compete for an agent's time and
attention, incentives for the performance of one may affect the performance of the other.
Specifically, incentives for easily-monitored tasks will need to be less high-powered than
they would be in a single-task model, in order to avoid diverting the agent's effort away
from other tasks. Indeed, this is the principal justification of paying agency staff fixed
salaries: if not they would tend to focus on those aspects of the job that affected their
salaries to the exclusion of other, perhaps more important tasks. As it is, the easily-
monitored tasks tend to be those that involve the inputs into the aid process; the output-
related tasks tend to be relatively hard to monitor. The presence of input bias in the aid
process would almost certainly be exacerbated if agency staff were not paid fixed
salaries. The model of the next section takes this idea a stage further by considering the
determinants of a (constrained) optimal allocation of tasks.
3. A Model of Multiple Tasks
In this section we present the outline of a multi-task principal-agent model, due to
Dewatripont et. al. (2000). In this model the principal is taken to represent either an
organisation or a market that is interested in the talent revealed by an agent's actions, and
will reward the agent according to the value of that talent (insofar as it can be inferred
from observed behaviour). It is assumed that the agent is assigned to work on some
number n of tasks (one of the purposes of the model is to show how the incentives for
effort vary with the number of tasks). The agent begins by choosing an unobservable
vector of costly actions a=(a1,....,an), incurring private cost (a), and yielding a vector of
observable outcomes y=(y1,....,yn). The result is a reward t to the agent, whose utility is
this reward minus the cost of his actions t-c(a).
This reward reflects the market's expectation of the agent's talent q. Dewatripo t et.al.
show that in equilibrium, the marginal cost of the agent’s actions will be set equal to the
covariance of talent and the likelihood ratio. Put simply, this means that effort is higher
when observed behaviour is more informative about the agent's talent.
Using this basic result, Dewatripont et al. go on to show (i ter alia) the following:
· When only the aggregate performance on all n tasks together is observable,
equilibrium total effort is decreasing in the number of tasks entrusted to the agent.
They interpret this is implying a ''benefit from focus'', in that the performance of a
more limited number of tasks increases the ability of the market to infer talent from
performance
· In addition, under certain conditions governing the interaction of talent and effort,
even when the agent focuses on a single task, effort is higher when the market knows
exactly which task this is rather than having to infer it from observable outcomes. The
authors interpret this as implying the superiority of giving clear rather than ''fuzzy''
missions to bureaucratic organisations. In the context of aid agencies it can also be
interpreted to mean that a degree of input bias is unavoidable, since clear missions are
easier to define with respect to inputs (budgetary allocations, finance, contracts,
experts) than with respect to outputs (project outcomes and impact).
· When tasks require different talents, it is better to group together tasks that require
similar talents. This is interpreted as implying that it is better to employ specialists
than generalists.
The results of Dewatripont et.al. are important and original, but they have one
particular limitation. They demonstrate the benefits of specialization and of precision in
bureacratic organization, but they ignore their costs. Taken literally, their paper would
imply, for example, that if only aggregate performance measures were available, each
agent should undertake only a single task. Given that tasks for this purpose can be
defined as narrowly as we please, this would imply a degree of specialisation against
which Fordist production techniques would seem like dilettantism. And it would certainly
imply that all aid agencies ever seen have been utterly disastrously structured for the
nature of the tasks in hand.
So it is important to develop the insights of these authors by considering the nature of
the trade-offs that have to be made in bureaucratic task design: what are the costs of
specialisation to be set against the benefits? Describing this trade-off is the main task of
the model in the next section. There we shall take seriously the idea that different tasks
require different talents. However, talents may be correlated, and the performance on
different tasks may be complementary. So too much specialisation is costly for two
reasons. First, it does not exploit the fact that an agent who is good at one task may be
good at another task that is complementary to the first. Secondly, it does not use the
information revealed by performance on one task about the agent's talent for the other: in
an organisation that seeks to use performance as a guide to promotion this agent will be
valuable. The model will therefore be one with two periods, rather artificially
distinguished so that in the second, information is valuable purely for intrinsic task
performance, while in the first it is also valuable for promotion.
